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TESTIMONY ON MANDATORY MINIMUM SENTENCES 
Testimony Chief Justice Gants delivered to the Massachusetts Legislature’s 
Joint Committee on the Judiciary at the Massachusetts State House on 
June 9, 2015. 
I want to thank Chairmen Brownsberger and Fernandes, and the Members 
of the Committee for the opportunity to testify before you today. I am here to 
explain why the Legislature should abolish mandatory minimum sentences for 
drug crimes. I will seek to present you with the facts that demonstrate the wis-
dom of repealing mandatory minimum sentences in these cases, taking the lead 
from a former Chief Justice of the Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams, who 
once wisely stated “facts are stubborn things.” 
There are at least three reasons why the Legislature needs to abolish man-
datory minimum sentences: racial justice, justice reinvestment, and fairness in 
sentencing. Let me begin with racial justice: mandatory minimum sentences 
have a disparate impact on persons of color. I can spare you a thousand words 
by turning your attention to . . . . [a] chart [that] shows that in 2013, 44% of all 
persons convicted of drug offenses were persons of color, but 75% of all per-
sons convicted of drug offenses with mandatory minimum sentences were per-
sons of color. This remarkable 31% differential is not a one year phenomenon; 
it is the same differential as in 2002. And the differential during this twelve-
year period never fell below 20%. Given the durability of this racially dispar-
ate treatment over time, there is no reason to believe that the past will not be 
prologue. If you do not abolish mandatory minimum sentences for drug of-
fenses, you must accept the tragic fact that this disparate treatment of persons 
of color will be allowed to continue. 
Let me turn now to justice reinvestment. Every time a judge is required to 
impose a mandatory minimum sentence that is greater than the sentence that 
the judge otherwise would have imposed if the judge were allowed to apply 
individualized, evidence-based best practices in sentencing, the taxpayer is 
paying money to incarcerate that offender longer than he or she should be in-
carcerated. That money could be better spent on programs that are designed to 
combat our opiate abuse crisis. We have too few drug treatment beds; too few 
programs to assist those battling mental health problems; too few probation 
officers to closely supervise those in our drug courts and in our HOPE-MORR 
programs. The money saved from abolishing mandatory minimum sentences in 
drug cases is money diverted from needless over-incarceration that can be 
more wisely spent on programs proven to help those struggling with opiate 
abuse. 
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I wish to address some of the criticisms that have been leveled against 
this justice reinvestment argument. Some note, correctly, that Massachusetts is 
already the 48th lowest in the nation in our rate of incarceration per 100,000 
residents. It is true that, in any discussion of mass incarceration, we should not 
fairly be lumped with states with far higher rates of incarceration. But it is fair 
to compare where Massachusetts is today in terms of our rate of incarceration 
with where we have been over the past 45 years. . . . [O]ur rate of incarceration 
per 100,000 residents today is 306, which is approximately 500% greater than 
it was in 1974 and 1975, when our violent crime rate was approximately where 
it is today and when our property crime rate was more than twice as high as it 
is today. I am not suggesting that we should return our rate of incarceration to 
where it was in the mid-1970s, but do we need to be five times higher? Think 
how much money could be diverted to drug and mental health treatment if we 
were three or four times higher. It should be plain that increasing the rate of 
incarceration by 500% has not prevented the most severe opiate abuse crisis in 
my lifetime; it should also be plain that the first and most important step need-
ed to address that crisis is to ensure that drug treatment is available to all who 
need it, and that justice reinvestment will help free up the funds to do so. 
It should also be plain that we can eliminate mandatory minimum sen-
tences in drug offenses without any adverse impact on public safety. Other 
states, including Michigan, New York, and Rhode Island, have eliminated or 
substantially reduced the scope of mandatory minimum sentences in drug cas-
es. Since doing so, the violent crime rate in these three states combined has 
fallen on average by 7.4% and the property crime rate has fallen on average by 
14.1%. Here in Massachusetts, the legislation enacted in 2010 and 2012 that 
reduced the scope of minimum mandatory drug sentencing has had no apparent 
adverse impact on public safety: between 2010 and 2012, the violent crime rate 
fell by 13.1% and the property crime rate fell by 8.4%, and since 2012, both 
the violent crime and property crime rates have continued to fall. 
[The data] also speaks to the argument that the increase in mandatory 
minimum drug sentences in 1980 reduced the rate of violent crime. It is true 
that the rate of violent crime dropped in the 1980s but it increased in the early 
1990s to the point that it was considerably higher than it was in 1980. If one is 
to credit the increase in mandatory minimum drug sentences in 1980 with the 
reduction in violent crime in the 1980s, one could just as well blame them for 
the increase in violent crime in the 1990s. I think it is fair to say that the social 
science scholarship, including the empirical research presented last week in 
this auditorium at the MassINC conference, has demonstrated that mandatory 
minimum drug sentences deserve neither the credit nor the blame. 
Let me also address the argument that, without mandatory minimum sen-
tences, judges would be sentencing every drug offender to probation for traf-
ficking crimes. . . . Apart from the school zone mandatory minimum, all of [the 
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drug crimes with mandatory minimum sentences] are crimes that may proceed 
only in the Superior Court, not in the District Court or the Boston Municipal 
Court. . . . [For such cases,] even where there is no mandatory minimum sen-
tence, judges still sentence 77% of offenders to prison or the house of correc-
tion. [The data also] gives you a window as to what would likely happen if you 
abolished mandatory minimum sentences in drug cases––most drug offenders 
would still be incarcerated, but their sentences on average would be modestly 
lower. Where there is a mandatory minimum sentence, the median sentence is 
42–60 months in state prison and 24 months in the house of correction; where 
there is not, the median sentence is 36–48 months in state prison and 17.5 
months in the house of correction. I know of no evidence to suggest that a re-
duction of this magnitude in the length of incarceration would have a signifi-
cant adverse effect on the level of deterrence for drug offenses. 
Let me also address the argument that only the worst drug offenders are 
given mandatory minimum sentences by showing you . . . . 54% of those sen-
tenced to mandatory minimum sentences in FY2013 had either no criminal 
record, a minor record, or a moderate record. 
When you think about it, this is not surprising. Most drug distribution 
cases are not realistically “tryable” once the motion to suppress is denied, be-
cause the case arises from an undercover buy-bust or from the search of a resi-
dence or vehicle where drugs are found. Where a case is not “tryable,” the 
prosecutor, for all practical purposes, will choose the sentence, because the 
defendant has the choice of going to trial, where he will lose and receive the 
mandatory minimum sentence, or pleading to the sentencing offer made by the 
prosecutor. The cases that generally go to trial are the “tryable” ones: the girl-
friend who lives with the defendant at the residence but claims that she was not 
involved in his drug distribution, the passenger in the car who claims that the 
drugs were not his, or the driver of the car where the drugs were found in a 
hide who claims that he did not own the care and did not know there was a 
hide. These are the persons who go to trial and who, if they lose at trial, are the 
persons who receive the mandatory minimum sentences. As a result, some-
times the defendants who are the least culpable are the ones who, as a result of 
mandatory minimum sentences, receive the highest sentences. 
This leads me to the third reason to abolish mandatory minimum sentenc-
ing in drug cases: fairness in sentencing. With mandatory minimum sentences 
in drug cases, the crime of conviction determines the sentence; minimum man-
datory sentences are neither individualized nor evidence-based. They are based 
on the principle that one size fits all, but one size does not fit all with respect to 
drug crimes. The drug dealer and his girlfriend who helps him package the 
drugs, the drug kingpin and the courier, the dealer who sells drugs to support 
his drug habit and the dealer who sells to get rich, may all be charged with the 
same crime, but they do not deserve the same sentence, and a judge free to sen-
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tence would not give them the same sentence. Prosecutors are entitled to a 
great deal of discretion, but that discretion should be limited to the decision as 
to which charge to bring, and which sentence to recommend to the judge. It 
should not include the discretion to determine the sentence. But when the 
charge determines the sentence, that is precisely the discretion that is given to 
the prosecutor. You would never pass a law that provides that, upon conviction, 
the sentence shall be set by the prosecutor. But, for all practical purposes, that 
is what laws establishing mandatory minimum sentences in drug cases do. The 
only way to ensure fairness in sentencing is to let prosecutors do the prosecut-
ing and let judges do the sentencing. 
